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Abstract
This paper attempts to investigate whether Ethical Investment (EI) could reduce 
the role of  dividend and debt in reducing agency conflict between controlling 
and public shareholders in Indonesia. I investigate market reaction when EI 
and Non-EI stocks announce dividend payments, dividend non-payments, and 
bond issuance. I also investigate the effect of  EI and the interaction between 
EI and dividend and between EI and debt on company’s value. The smaller 
market reaction shows that EI stocks contain less surprises, since EI stocks 
are able to reduce information asymmetry, and increase trust among investors. 
The empirical results show that market reaction for debt issuance is less positive 
for EI stocks than for Non-EI stocks. Regression analysis shows that EI 
strengthens the role of  debt in increasing company’s value. The role of  EI in 
reducing agency conflict seems to have multi-dimensions. Event studies show 
that debt could be used as a substitute for debt in reducing agency conflict, but 
regression result shows that EI complements debt in reducing agency conflicts, 
and increase company’s value. Overall I conclude that EI provide an important 
role as mechanisms to reduce agency conflict, and increase company’s value.
[Artikel ini menelisik apakah Ethical Investment (EI) dapat mengurangi 
peran dividen dan bunga dalam menekan konflik perusahaan antara manajer 
dan pemilik saham publik di Indonesia.  Reaksi pasar akan dilihat ketika 
stok EI dan non-EI mengumumkan dividen dibayarkan, dividen tidak 
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dibayarkan, dan bon pengeluaran. Hal lain yang juga dilihat adalah pengaruh 
dari EI dan interaksi antara EI dan dividen serta antara EI dan hutang 
pada nilai perusahaan. Reaksi pasar yang lebih kecil menunjukkan bahwa 
stok EI tidak banyak mengejutkan, karena stok EI dapat  mengurangi 
ketidaksinkronan informasi sekaligus meningkatkan kepercayaan investor. 
Analisis lapangan menunjukkan bahwa pengumuman tentang hutang 
perusahaan memiliki dampak kurang positif  pada stok EI daripada non-
EI. Sedangkan analisis regresi menunjukkan bahwa EI memperkuat peran 
hutang dalam meningkatkan nilai perusahaan. Sementara itu, peran EI 
dalam menekan konflik perusahaan tampak memiliki banyak dimensi. Secara 
umum dapat disimpulkan pula bahwa EI memiliki peran yang cukup penting 
dalam mekanisme untuk menekan agency conflict  dan meningkatkan 
nilai perusahaan.]
Keywords: Ethical Investment (EI), agency conflict, Daftar Efek Syariah 
(DES)
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A. Introduction
Conflict in corporation can be classified into two forms: agency 
conflict and non-agency conflict. In Finance, the term of  agency conflict 
is well known to describe conflict between manager and principal (owner). 
Non-agency conflict refers to conflicts related to company’s activities. 
Company’s activities could result in conflict with other related parties, 
either directly or indirectly.
Agency conflict could arise from separation between ownership 
and control in company, which results in conflict between owners and 
managers.1 In later development, agency conflict in company involves 
other parties, such as bondholders, creditors, controlling shareholders, 
and other stakeholders. These stakeholders have their own interests, 
depending on their objectives, but may conflict with other stakeholders’ 
1 Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, “Theory of  the Firm: Management Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of  Financial Economics, October 1976, 
pp. 305-360.
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interests.2 Each stakeholder may have different pay off  and risks. 
These asymmetric payoff  and risks could also result in conflict among 
stakeholders. There are some evidence of  agency conflict, such as free 
cash flow agency conflict,3 debt agency conflict,4 and conflict between 
controlling shareholders and public shareholders.5
Non-agency conflict arises from company’s activities that may have 
adverse impact and conflict with other parties, both internal and external 
parties. These parties include employees, suppliers, customers, society, 
and company’s environment.6 Several authors argue that objectives and 
activities of  company are not consistent with values of  religion,7 result 
in pollution and destruction of  environment,8 and conflict with values 
of  humanity.9
Various Corporate Governance mechanisms10 could be used to 
2 Jie Hu, Thomas H. Nu, “Insider Trading and Managerial Incentive,” Journal 
of  Banking and Finance, 2001, pp. 681-716.
3 Jensen, M.C., “Agency Cost of  Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Takeover, American Economic Review, May, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1986, pp. 323-339
4 Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, “Theory of  the Firm”.
5 Benjamin Mauri and Annete Pajuste, “Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm 
Value,” Journal of  Banking and Finance, 2005, pp. 1813-1834; Andrei Shleifer and R.W. 
Vishny, “A Survey of  Corporate Governance,” The Journal of  Finance, Vol. LII, No. 
2, June 1997, pp. 737-783; Juzhong Zhuang, et.all, Corporate Governance and Finance in 
East Asia- Study of  Indonesia, Republic of  Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila.
6 Jeffery Heinfeldt and Richard Curcio, “Employee Management Strategy, 
Stakeholder-Agency Theory, and the Value of  Firm,” Journal of  Financial and Strategic 
Decisions, Volume 10 Number 1 Spring 1997; Canice Prendergast, “Consumers and 
Agency Problem,” Working Paper 8445, 2001 (http:/www.nber.org/papers/w8445)
7 Laurence Iannaccone, “Introduction to the Economics of  Religion.”, Journal 
of  Economic Literature, vol. 36, November 1998, pp. 1465-1496.
8 Munoz, Maria Jesus -Torres, Maria AŁ ngeles Fernandez-Izquierdo and 
Maria Rosario Balaguer-Franch, “The social responsibility performance of  ethical and 
solidarity funds: an approach to the case of  Spain,” Business Ethics: A European Review, 
Volume 13 Numbers 2/3 April/July 2004, pp. 200-218.
9 M. Murningham. Corporation and Social Responsibility: a Historical Perspective (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1992).
10 Corporate Governance (CG) is known as mechanism to reduce conflict 
between company and its stakeholders. The coverage of  CG includes agency and non-
agency conflicts. Agency theory becomes part of  CG. In agency thoery, monitoring 
and bonding are mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts, but several authors include 
monitoring and bonding as part of  CG.  Shleifer dan Vishny (1997) include block holder 
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reduce agency conflict, either through monitoring, bonding, or ethical 
investment (EI). Dividend and debt policies, which are part of  bonding 
mechanism, are effective mechanisms to reduce agency conflict. In non 
agency conflict, company that considers and applies religion values, 
social corporate responsibiltiy, and universal values could reduce 
conflict between company and its society, its environment, and its other 
stakeholders.
Debt and dividend policies could traditionally be used as effective 
mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts. Several papers show that dividend 
and debt mechanisms are effective means in reducing conflict between 
controlling and public shareholders.11 In developing countries, dividend 
could be seen in two functions: agency context and legal protection. First, 
dividend provides more certainty so it could reduce conflict between 
controlling and public shareholders. Second, dividend could be seen as 
legal protection, especially for public or minority shareholders.12 Dividend 
policy in Indonesia is viewed more as agency hypotesis and used as 
mechanism to reduce agency conflict.13
Debt could improve company’s value because debt could reduce 
ownership as CG mechanism. John dan Sanbet 1998; Guercio, Dann dan Partch (2003); 
Brook, Handershott dan Lee, (2000) include internal mechanism (board of  executives) 
and external (market for corporate control) as CG mechanisms.  Renneboog (2000) 
includes ownership, market for corporate control, debt policy as CG mechanisms. Elston 
dan Goldberg (2003) include concentrated ownership as CG mechanism. Jensen uses 
four mechanisms in CG, that are board of  executives, stock market, regulation, and 
market factor. Klien (2002); Booth, Cornett dand Tehranian (2003) use composition 
of  board of  executives as CG mechanisms.
11 C. And Hansen Crutchly, “A Test of  The Agency Theory of  Managerial 
Ownership, Corporate Leverage and Corporate Dividend,” Financial Management, 18, 
1989, pp. 36-46; Klaus Gugler, “Corporate governance, dividend payout policy, and 
the interest between dividends, R&D, and Capital Investment,” Journal of  Banking & 
Finance 27, 2003, pp. 1297–1321.
12 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-des-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. 
Vishny, “Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World,” The Journal of  
Finance, Vol. LV, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-33; Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-des-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,“ 
Journal of  Financial Economics, 58, 2000, pp. 3-27.
13 Todd Mitton, “A Cross Firm Analysis of  the Impact of  Corporate Governance 
on The East Asian Financial Crisis,” The Journal of  Financial Economics, 2002, pp. 1-31; 
Johnson, Simon, Peter Boone”, Alasdair Breach, Eric Friedman, (2005), Corporate 
governance in the Asian ‘financial Crisis’,” Journal of  Financial Economics 58, pp. 141-186.
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agency conflict. Debt forces managers to avoid unnecessary expenses 
to improve efficiency.14 Debt is an effective mechsnism, especially 
if  a company faces serious agency conflict.15 Debt forces controlling 
shareholders to pay interest and loan repayment, hence not to waste free 
cash flows.
This paper investigates dividend policy, debt policy, and ethical 
investment (EI) as mechanisms to reduce agency conflict. I believe that 
this research will provide significant contribution to agency conflict 
literature, since investigation of  the use of  EI as mechanism to reduce 
agency conflict is relatively new. Most of  current literature investigates the 
use of  conventional methods to reduce agency conflict, such as dividend 
and debt policies. EI could reduce agency conflict, and then potentially 
could improve company’s performance and value, through the decrease 
of  agency conflict.
I define ethical investment (EI) as stocks that meet various 
syariah standards, which is known as syariah stocks. These standards in 
Indonesian stock market refer to stipulation of  DSN (Dewan Syariah 
Nasional, or National Syariah Board), number 40/DSN-MUI/X/2003. 
This research places EI along with dividend and debt mechanisms in 
reducing agency conflict. In this paper, EI will be used as “moderating 
variable”; a variable that moderates the effectiveness of  debt and dividend 
in reducing agency conflict between controlling and public shareholders. 
More specifically, I investigate whether EI decreases or increases the role 
of  debt and dividend in reducing the agency conflict. EI is an effective 
mechanism to reduce the agency conflict if  EI decreases the role of  debt 
and dividend in reducing the agency conflict, and otherwise. 
 I find that market reactions to dividend announcements for 
EI and non-EI stocks are negative, suggesting that dividend is not 
mechanism to reduce agency conflicts. Cross-sectional regression 
provides weak evidence that EI could reduce the role of  dividend in 
reducing agency conflict. In Indonesian context, this result may not be 
surprising, since in many corporations, controlling shareholders initiate 
14 Jensen, Gerald, R, (1986), “Agency Cost”.
15 Campbell II, T. L. and Keys, P. Y. “Corporate Governance in South Korea: 
The Chaebol Experience,” Journal of  Corporate Finance, 8, 2002; James F. Cotter, Sarah 
W. Peck, “The structure of  debt and active equity investors: The case of  the buyout 
specialist,” Journal of  Financial Economics 59, 2001, pp. 101-147
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dividend payments. Thus, dividend is not likely used as mechanism to 
reduce conflict between controlling shareholders and public shareholders. 
For announcements of  bond issuance, I find that market reacts negatively 
for EI stocks, but positively for non-EI stocks. These results suggest that 
bond is not used as mechanism to reduce agency conflict for EI stocks, 
while for Non-EI stocks, bond is used as mechanism to reduce agency 
conflict. The negative result for EI stocks may also related to the fact 
that debt level for EI stocks is limited to certain level. An increase to the 
level beyond certain level is bad news for EI stocks. These stocks will be 
likely removed from list of  Syariah stocks. Furthermore, cross-sectional 
regressions support my conjecture. In regressions using companies’ values 
as dependent variables, EI decreases the roles of  debt as mechanisms in 
reducing agency conflicts. Regression coefficient for interaction between 
EI and debt shows negative signs, suggesting that EI moderates the role 
of  debt in reducing agency conflict.
I organize this paper as follows. Section 2 and 3 discusses literature 
review and hypothesis development. Section 4 discusses research 
methodology, while section 5 presents empirical findings. Section 6 
concludes.
B. Conflict in Corporation
1.	 Agency	Conflict,	non-Agency	Conflict	and	Ethical	Investment
Agency conflict arises from various parties who have different 
interests in a company. These parties include managers, owners, 
controlling shareholders, public shareholders, society, religious parties, 
and other components of  society. In general, there are three types of  
agency conflicts that are often discussed in finance:16 First, conflict 
between managers and principals. This conflict arises from separation 
between ownership and control in company. Shareholders own the 
company but delegate their control to managers.17 Second, conflict 
16 Kose John, Lemma W. Senbet, “Corporate governance and board 
effectiveness,” Journal of  Banking & Finance 22, 1998, pp. 371-403.
17 A. A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New 
York, NY, Harcourt, 1932); M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, “Theory ofthe Firm”; 
Andrei Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, “A Survey of  Corporate Governance,” The Journal of  
Finance, Vol. LII, No. 2, June, pp. 737-783 and see Crutchly, C. And Hansen 1989, “A 
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between shareholders and bondholders. These parties have asymmetric 
payoff. Whereas shareholders have payoff  related to company’s value, 
bondholders have fixed claim over company. This pattern creates agency 
conflict that is usually called agency cost of  debt.18 Third, conflict between 
controlling and public shareholders. This conflict arises if  controlling 
shareholders try to expropriate public shareholders.19 
Other conflict in corporation is called non-agency conflict. This 
conflict arises if  company’s activities are not consistent with the interests 
of  other stakeholders (not just shareholders). These stakeholders 
include employees, customers, suppliers, religion values, society, and 
environement.20 
2.	 Sources	of 	Conflict	in	Coorporation
There are various sources that may cause agency conflict: First, 
asymmetric information between principals and managers. Managers 
possess better information about company than principals. Asymmetric 
information may also exist in the relationship between controlling and 
public shareholders, as well as between shareholders and bondholders.21 
Second, free cash flow in corporation. Managers want to keep free cash 
flow rather than distributing free cash flow to stockholders.22 Third, 
different view of  risks between principal and managers.23 Shareholders 
(principal) tend to choose investment with high risk with expectation 
to obtain higher profit. However, managers tend to choose investment 
Test of  The Agency Theory”, 1997, pp. 36-46.
18 Andrei Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, “A Survey of  Corporate Governance,” The 
Journal of  Finance, Vol. LII, No. 2, June, 1997, pp. 737-783; C. Crutchly and Hansen, “A 
Test of  The Agency Theory.”
19 Benjamin Mauri and Annete Pajuste, “Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm 
Value,” Journal of  Banking and Finance, 2005, pp. 1813-1834.
20 Jeffery Heinfeldt and Richard Curcio, “Employee Management Strategy”; 
Canice Prendergast,  “Consumers and Agency Problem,’ Working Paper, 2001 (http:/
www.nber.org/papers, pp. 1071-1102)
21 Timothy Brailsford and J. Daniel Yeoh, “Agency Problems and 
CapitalExpenditure Announcements,” Journal of  Business, vol. 77, no. 2, 2004, pp. 
223-256.
22 M.C. Jensen,  “Agency Cost.”
23 Katheleen, M. Eisenhardt,  “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” 
Academy of  Management Review, 1989.
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with low risks. Fourth, difference in time horizon between managers and 
stakeholders.24 Stakeholders tend to choose investment with longer time 
horizon with expectation to get higher profit. However, managers tend 
to choose investment with shorter time horizon.
Factors that cause non-agency conflict mainly come from 
company’s activities that are considered inconsistent with ethical values. 
Several investments, such as investing in riba activities, exploiting humans 
and environments,are considered inconsistent with values of  certain 
religious teachings, so the investments have to be excluded from group 
of  ethical investments.25 Corporate activites that result in conflict with 
its stakeholders will also create non-agency conflicts. Thus corporates 
that neglect its environment will be viewed as having high degree of  
non-agency conflicts, while corporates that are environment friendly 
will be viewed as having low degree of  non-agency conflicts.26 The 
same situation holds for companies that have conflicts with consumers, 
employees, suppliers, andother stakeholders, sincethese companies 
neglect their rights.27
3.	 Ethical	Investment	(EI)
EI is a combination between business and certain values to reach 
broader objectives, which are financial and non-financial gains. Criteria for 
ethical investments are highly influenced by each country condition and 
basic values affecting the investment. The definition of  ethical investment 
has been developing. The definitions below emphasizes more on social 
aspect in investment rather than other business aspects. 
The United Kingdom Social Investment Forum (UKSIF) defines 
ethical investment more broadly: ‘Investment that enables investors to combine 
financial objectives with their social values, linksinvestors to the areas of  social 
24 Patrick McColgan, “Agency Theory and Corporate Governance,” Working 
Paper, 2001.
25 Sam Hakim, Manochehr Rashidian, “Risk and Return of  Islamic Market 
Indexes,”  un-published paper; Hellsten, Sirkku,  Chris Mallin, “Are Ethical or  Socially 
Responsible Investments Socially Responsible,” Journal of  Business Ethics,  2006, pp. 393–
406; Grant Michelson, Nick Wailes, Sandra van der Laan, “Ethical InvestmentProcesses 
and Outcomes,” Journal of  Business Ethics 52, 2004, pp. 1-10.
26 D. Wood, “Corporate Social Performance Revisited,” Academy of  Management 
Review 16, 1991, pp. 691-718; Maria Jesus Munoz, et al., “The social responsibility.”
27 Canice Prendergast,  “Consumers and Agency Problem.”
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justice, economic development, peace and the environment.’28 Cowton defines EI as 
investment decisions which are based on social and ethical values as their 
objectives.29 Another definition is provided by Heese: EI is an investment 
that uses social values as its financial objective.30 The development of  ethical 
values from various countries shows that criteria for EI are drawn from 
various sources: religion, corporate social responsibility, environmental 
issues, and universal values.
This research uses EI based on Islamic values. In Indonesia, Islamic 
values in the economy are implemented through decree of  National 
Syariah Council (NSC) of  Indonesian Ulema Council (IUC). The decree 
states that the business or the objects of  the business have to meet criteria 
establised by NSC of  IUC, and Capital Market and Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Board (Bapepem-LK), which is summarized in NSC of  IUC 
fatwa, number: 40/DSN-MUI/X/2003, on Capital Market, and General 
Guidance on the appliaction of  Syariah Principles in Capital Market. This 
general guidance is followed by Bapepam-LK rule number: KEP.-130/
BL/2006 about the issuance of  syariah securities. The rule provides 
general considerations on business that conflict syariah principles. These 
businesses include: 1) Gambling and activities that could be classified 
as gambling or forbidden business. 2) Financial services that apply riba 
(usury, interest), trading activities that have gharar (uncertainty) and maysir 
(speculation) elements. 3) Production, distribution, trades, or providing: 
(a) Goods and services that are forbidden because of  its substance 
(haram li-dzatihi); (b) goods and services that are forbidden, because 
of  outside of  its substance (the substance is halal), and are stipulated 
by Indonesia Ulema Council, and (c) goods and services that damage 
moral. 4) Investing in company that have more dominant debt level than 
its capital , from financial institutions that apply usury business, except 
for companies that have been certified its ‘syariahness (legalistic)’ by 
28 J. Elkington, Cannibals with Forks.The Triple Bottom Line of  21st Century Business 
(Oxford: Capstone, 1999).
29 Christopher J. Cowton, “Playing by the rules Ethical: criteria at an ethical 
investment fund,” Journal Business Ethics: A European Review ,Volume 8 Number, January 
1999, pp. 60-69.
30 Karen Heese,  “The Development of  Socially Responsible Investment in 
South Africa: experience and evolution of  SRI in global markets,” Development Southern 
Africa Vol. 22, No.5, December 2005, pp.729-739.
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Indonesia Ulema Council.
The Bapepam-LK rule is followed by regulation number: KEP-
314/BL/2007, about the criteria and issuance of  syariah stocks, which 
states that syariah stocks should have the following: 1) Total interest-based 
debt over total equitydoes not exceed 82%, or the ratio of  interest-based 
debt over total equity does not exceed 45%, and 2) Total interest income 
and other illicit income over total income (revenue) do not exceed 10%. 
These criteria along with general consideration mentioned above 
set the requirement for syariah stocks. I use these criteria to classify stocks 
either as syariah or non-syariah stocks.
C. Literature Review and Hyphotheses Development
1.	 Agency	Conflict,	Dividend	Policy,	and	Ethical	Investment	(EI)
Mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts include various means, such 
as dividend, debt, as well as policies in composition of  board of  exectuives 
and commissioners. Dividend policy is one of  many mechanisms to 
reduce agency conflict between controlling and public shareholders. 
Moreover, La Porta, et al. show that high dividend payment is another 
form of  protection for public shareholders.31 Mutamimah strengthens La 
Porta et. al by showing that dividend policy is an effective mechanism to 
reduce conflict between controlling and public shareholders, in companies 
with highly concentrated and those with less concentrated ownership.32 
Faccio, et al.show that increases in dividend will restrict controlling 
shareholders’ actions that do harm to public shareholders.33 
I introduce Ethical Investment (EI) as a complement to dividend 
policy as mechanisms to reduce agency conflict. Beal et. al (2005) show 
that investment in ethical companies provides financial gains, as well 
31 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-des-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. 
Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,” Journal of  Financial Economics 
58, pp. 3-27.
32 Mutamimah, “Kebijakan Dividen, Utang dan Investasi sebagai 
MekanismePengurang Konflik Keagenan antara Pemegang Saham Mayoritas dengan 
Minoritas, “ Ph.D Disertation at UGM, 2006.
33 Mara Faccio, Lary HP, Lang and Young Leslie,  “Debt and Expropriation,“ 
Working Paper, pp. 1-35.
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as non-financial gains, and is consistent with social values.34 Investors 
of  EI requirethat board of  exectuives has ethical perspective and has 
to pay attention to investor and all stakeholder’s interests.35 Activities 
of  EI company have orientation for sustainability and disclosure for all 
stakeholders, and are part of  Corporate Governance.36 This condition 
could reduce conflict in corporation by minimizing information 
asymmetry and improve company’s performance.37 The mechanism of  
EI as Corporate Governance is expected to improve investors’ trust to 
company, and decrease their expectation for dividend in reducing agency 
conflict. The lesser demand for dividend to reduce agency conflict for 
EI companies will result in lower investors reaction for EI companies 
than that for non EI companies. In such situation, I expect that EI 
mechanism would reduce the effectiveness of  dividend policy in reducing 
conflict between controlling and public shareholders. I develop my first 
hypothesis as follows:
H1: Ethical Investment weakens the effectiveness of  dividend policy as 
mechanism in reducing agency conflict between controlling and public 
shareholders.
2.	 Agency	Conflict,	Debt	Policy,	and	Ethical	Investment
Debt policy is one of  Corporate Governance mechanisms that 
could reduce conflict between controlling and public shareholders. 
Debt will be followed by periodic interest and principal payments that 
could reduce free cash flow. The payment could signal that controlling 
shareholders do not use cash flow to their advantage. Also, with high 
payments, managers will be forced to increase efficiency and improve 
34 Beal, Diana J., Michelle Goyen, and Peter Phlilips, (2005), Why Do We Invest 
Ethically?,  The Journal of  Investing, Fall, pp. 66-77
35 Rodger Spiller,  “Ethical business and investment: A model for business and 
society,” Journal of  Business Ethics, Sept. 2000.
36 Ans Kolk,  “Sustainability, Accounting and Corporate Governance: Exploring 
Multinationals’ Reporting Practices’,” Business Strategy and the Environment, the KPMG 
International Survey of  Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2005, pp. 1-18.
37 C.C. Verschoor, “A Study of  The Link Between as Corporation’s Financial 
Performance and Its Commitment to Ethics,” Journal of  Business Ethics, 17, 1998, pp. 
1509-1516.
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investment decisions. Debt could be used effectively as mechanism to 
reduce conflict between controlling and public shareholders, as well as 
mechanism to improve company’s efficiency.38
In several countries, researches on debt policy yield mixed results. 
Debt level in Indonesia is already high.39 Debt increase will create new 
conflict between shareholders and bondholders. Debt policy in such 
situation could harm creditors and public shareholders, especially in 
countries with low legal protection, poor corporate governance, and weak 
legal protection.40 The high debt level in Indonesia may result in additional 
debt not as a means to reduce agency conflict, but instead a vehicle to 
create new conflict, or to increase agency conflict. In such situation, we 
can expect to have negative market reaction for debt increase. 
EI mecahnism could be used to complement debt mechanism 
as a means to reduce agency conflict for several reasons. First, syariah 
criteria in Indonesia requires that to be included in the list, company 
must maintain its ratio of  total interest based debt over total equity 
not to exceed 82%, and the maximum proportion of  total debt to total 
equity is 45%. This restriction is expected to have impact on company’s 
performance and to minimize bankruptcy risk, thus adding value to 
EI stocks. Second, as argued before, syariah criteria can be expected 
to increase investor trust on the company. Improved trust could be 
expected to reduce cost of  capital. Investor reaction to debt policy could 
be expected to decrease when investor trust for the company is high. EI 
mechanism could improve performance and reduce conflict with society, 
environment, and religion. I develop second hypothesis as follows:
H2: EI weakens the effectiveness of  debt as mechanism in reducing agency 
conflict between controlling and public shareholders.
38 Timothy J. Brailsford and Daniel Yeoh, “Agency Problems and Capital 
Expenditure Announcements,” Journal of  Business, vol. 77, no. 2, 2004, pp. 223-256.
39 Se-Jik Kim and Mark R. Stone, “Corporate Leverage, Bankruptcy, and Output 
Adjustment in Post-Crisis East Asia,” IMF Working Paper, October 1999, pp. 1-29
40 Rafael LaPorta, et al. “Investor Protection.”; Atanasov, Vladimir, “How 
much value can blockholders tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian mass privatization 
auctions,” Journal of  Financial Economics 76, 2005, pp. 191–234.
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D. Data and Fact Findings
In 2003, Supervisory Board of  Stock Market signed an MOU with 
DSN-MUI to select syariah stocks in Indonesia.PT Danareksa, Jakarta 
Stock Exchange, and MUI work together to develop list of  syariah 
stocks. Stocks listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange are selected using syariah 
criterion to be included in the list of  syariah stocks. On July 3, 2000, list 
of  syariah stocks was introduced. I use the standards to develop my own 
list of  syariah stocks.41 
I then select companies from year 2000-2007 that pay dividend and 
do not pay dividend, and also issue bond. Using the list of  Syariah stocks 
I develop, I categorize the sample into two groups: Syariah investment 
or Ethical Investment and Non-Ethical Investment. I define dividend 
paying and non-paying stocks as stocks that pay dividend and those that 
stop paying dividend relative to previous year (in previous year stocks pay 
dividend, while in current year, stocks do not pay dividend). Stocks can 
be counted more than one in my sample. Table 1 shows the distribution 
of  the sample. For EI stocks I collect 293 stock years, while for Non-EI 
stocks, I collect 254 stock years. 
Table 1. Distrribution of  Stocks in the Sample
EI stocksNon-EI stocks
261244Sub-total dividens-non payment 
dividend stocks 
176131Pay dividend
85113Do not pay dividend
3210Issue bond
293254Total stocks
41 The standards are developed from DSN-MUI which are translated into 
Stipulation of  Chairman of  Stock Market Supervisory Board and Financial Instituion, 
number: KEP.-130/BL/2006 and appendix number: IX.A.13 and stipulation  number: 
KEP-314/BL/2007, and appendix  II.K.I.
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2.	 Variables	Definition
Dependent variables in this research are market reaction and 
company’s value. I use standard event study methodolgy to calculate 
market reaction around events of  announcements of  dividend payments 
and non-payments, and bond issuance. The event date for dividend 
announcements is the date of  shareholders meeting, when company 
announces dividend distribution or do not pay dividend. For bond 
issuance, I use the date when company announces bond issuance. 
I calculate average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) around event date, defined from days -10 to 
days +10 relative to event date.42 Abnormal return is calculated as stock 
return return minus market return (market adjusted abnormal return). For 
company’s value, I use modifiedTobin’s Q, proxied as follows: ( Market 
Value of  stocks + Book Value of  Debt ) / Total Book Value of  Assets. 
I use the same fiscal values for these variables.
I I use dividend pay out ratio (dividend per-share divided by earning 
per-share) for dividend policy, and total debt over total equity as proxy 
for debt level. EI is proxied by list of  Syariah Securities screened by the 
Syariah criteria.
I use size as control variable. Size is well known to have effect 
on company’s performance. Moreover, larger company tends to pay 
higher dividend and have higher debt level. Size is proxied by market 
capitalization of  company’s stocks (market price times number of  
shares outstanding). I also include ownership concentration as control 
variable. Ownership concentration is calculated using Herfindhal Index 
of  shareholders with a minimum of  20% holdings.
2.	 Descriptive	Statistics
This section starts with descriptive statistics, then proceeds to 
hypothesis testing. Tables2 and 3 show descriptive statitistic for EI stocks 
and Non-EI stocks. 
42 Initially, I define event windows from days -10 to +10. Since it is possible to 
have information leakage before the event, and it is difficult to locate exactly on which 
days the leakage occurs, then I calculate event windows that provide the strongest 
results. For this reason, in this paper, I report different event windows for dividend 
payment, dividen non-payment, and bond issuance. I thank anonymous reviewer for 
pointing possibility of  information leakage.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for EI stocks
Long of  
Size
DebtDividendCompany’s 
Value
H e r fi xd a l 
Index for 
Ownership
0.441.410.560.7711.52Mean
0.211.551.470.780.94Std dev
0.050.040.020.019.80Minimum
0.8711.1012.773.8315.55Maximum
The above table presents desciptive statitistics for the sample. 
Herfindhal Index is calculated for shareholders with a minimum holding 
of  20%. Company’s value is calculated as Market Value of  Stocks plus 
Book Value of  Debt divided by total asset. Dividend is calculated as 
Dividend per-share divided by Earning Per-Share, Debt is calculated 
as Debt divided by Total Equity. Size is market price times number of  
shares outstanding. Negative numbers for dividend and debt are deleted.
Table3. Descriptive Statistics for Non-EI stocks
Log of  
Size
DebtDividendDebtLog of  
Size
0.371.210.341.7711.45Mean
0.220.960.581.200.86Std dev
0.060.580.010.539.53 Minimum
0.8610.513.9710.1614.08Maximum
The above table presents desciptive statitistics for the sample. 
Herfindhal Index is calculated for shareholders with a minimum holding 
of  20%. Company’s value is calculated as Market Value of  Stocks plus 
Book Value of  Debt divided by total asset. Dividend is calculated as 
Dividend per-share divided by Earning Per-Share, Debt is calculated 
as Debt divided by Total Equity. Size is market price times number of  
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shares outstanding. Negative numbers for dividend and debt are deleted.
Tables 2 and 3 show that ownership concentrations between EI 
and Non-EI stocks tend to be similar. EI stocks tend to be larger, with 
larger dispersion, than non-EI stocks. Company’s value for EI tends to 
be larger than that for Non-EI. The higher value for this variable may 
reflect high future expectation for this group of  companies. Dividend 
pay-out ratio for EI companies tends to be larger than that of  Non-EI 
companies. One possible reason for such finding is that EI companies 
tend to have better performance. Debt level for EI companies tend to be 
lower than that for Non-EI companies. This may be a result of  Syariah 
criterion for debt level; Syariah stocks require that debt level (interest 
based debt over total equity) should not exceed 82%.
E. Ethical Investment and Market Reaction 
1.	 Market	Reaction	to	Announcements	of 	Dividend	Payments
Table 4 shows market reaction to announcement of  dividend 
payments. I report average abnormal return in days=0, and cumulative 
average abnormal return for days -2 to +2.43
Table 4. 
Market Reaction To Announcements of  Dividend Payment
Non-EIEI
-0.0520.022CAAR2
0.0724p-value for CAAR 
difference
The above table reports market reaction to announcements 
of  dividend payments. The date of  announcements is the date of  
shareholders’ meeting. Ethical Investments (EI) are stocks included in 
List of  Syariah Securities. Abnormal return is calculated using market 
43 As I mentioned above, I use different periods for the event windows. Thus I 
report periods of  days -2 to +2 for dividend payments, periods of  days 0 for dividend 
non-payments, and periods of  days -3 to +3 for debt issuance.
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adjusted, that is return minus market return. CAAR2 is cumulative 
abnormal return from days -2 to +2. P-value is in the last row. 
The table shows that average abnormal returns for both EI and 
Non-EI stocks are difference. Cumulative average abnormal return for 
EI stocks shows positive number, while that for Non-EI stocks show 
negative number. The positive reaction for EI stocks is consistent with 
previous findings for dividend increase or initiation. Negative reaction 
for Non-EI stocks could be interpreted that dividend paid is less than 
investors’ expectation. This argument is supported by lower level of  
dividend payment, which is around 0.33 (see table 3 above).
This finding seems to suggest that EI stocks could not mitigate 
the role of  dividend as mechanism to reduce agency conflict. I expect 
to have less positive market reaction for EI stocks than that for non-EI 
stocks. Instead, I have positive market reaction for EI stocks (CAAR2 
of  0.022), and negative reaction for non-EI stocks (CAAR2 of  -0.052). 
This result may reveal another interpretation. Conversations with 
several practicioners and anecdotal evidence reveal that, in Indonesia, 
controlling shareholders usually initiate dividend payments. These 
shareholders usually demand certain amount of  dividend to managers, 
and then formalized in shareholders’ meeting. With such big power, 
dividend is not likely used as mechanism to control conflict between 
controlling and public shareholders. Controlling shareholders can ask 
for dividend practically at any amount they want. New conflict may arise 
from such practice, that is conflict between controlling shareholders and 
public shareholders. Dividend payments may exacerbate this conflict, 
for example, by asking too much dividend wich results in less fund 
available for profitable investments, hence lowering company’s value. 
The explanation above seems to be consistent with our finding above. 
For non-EI stocks, market reaction is negative, suggesting that agency 
conflict between controlling and public shareholders may increase. For 
EI stocks, market reaction is positive, suggesting that the agency conflict 
is minimized. 
2.	 Market	Reaction	to	Announcements	of 	Dividend	Non-Payment
Table 5 shows market reaction to announcements of  dividend non-
payments. I define dividend non-payment when a company announces 
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that it will not pay dividend this year, when previous year paid dividend.
 Table 5.
Market Reaction To Announcements of  Dividend Non-Payment
Non-EIEI
-0.002-0.026CAARt0
0.0042p-value for CAAR
The above table reports market reaction to announcements of  
dividend non-payments. Dividend non-payments are defined when 
company announces not to pay dividend this year, while it pays dividend 
in previous year. The date of  annuncements is the date of  shareholders’ 
meeting. Ethical Investments (EI) are stocks included in List of  Syariah. 
Abnormal return is calculated using market adjusted, that is return minus 
market return. CAAR0 is the cumulative abnormal return during days 0. 
P-value is in the last row. 
The table shows that market reactions (CAARt0) for both EI and 
non-EI stocks are negative. Cumulative Abnormal Return for EI stocks 
tend to be smaller than those for non-EI stocks. The difference between 
CAAR for EI and that for non-EI is significant at 5%. 
One possible explanation for negative reaction for dividend non-
payment comes from signaling theory. In this case, dividend is used to 
signal company’s future. Dividend non-payment may signal poor future 
condition; market reacts negatively to announcements of  dividend 
non-payments. The negative reactions apply for both company: EI and 
non-EI stocks. 
Why does market reaction for non-EI stocks have less negative 
value? The explanation may come from agency theories. Recall from 
previous subsection, dividend payments may actually increase conflict 
between majority and public shareholders. The less dividend paid may 
help reduce this conflict. The less negative value for non-EI stocks 
suggests that non-dividend payment may actually help non-EI companies, 
by reducing the negative effect of  high dividend payment. Instead of  
paying out cash as dividend as demanded by majority shareholders, 
Islamic Ethical Investment
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2013 M/1434 H 207
company can use cash for investment that can add value, and thus 
beneficial to public shareholders too. This phenomenon may result in 
less negative effect for non-EI stocks.
3.	 Market	Reaction	for	Bond	Announcements
In this section, I investigate market reaction for announcements 
of  bond issuance. Table 6shows market reaction to the announcements.
 Table 6.
Market Reaction To Announcements of  Bond Issuance
Non-EIEI
0.0709-0.0327CAARt3
0.0344p-value for CAAR 
difference
This table reports market reaction to announcements of  bond 
issueance. Ethical Investments (EI) are stocks included in List of  Syariah 
Securities issued by Supervisory Board for Stock Market. Abnormal 
return is calculated using market adjusted, that is return minus market 
return. CAAR3 is cumulative abnormal return from days -3 to +3. P-value 
is in the last row.
Table 6 shows that Cumulative abnormal return from days-3 to 
+3 (CAARt3) for EI stocks shows negative numbers, while for non-EI 
stocks shows positive number.Negative reaction for EI stocks indicates 
that debt is not used as mechanism to reduce agency conflict between 
controlling and public shareholders. Researches on debt policy yield 
different conclusions. Debt level in Indonesian is relatively high.44 
The new debt will cretae additional conflict between debtholders and 
shareholders.45 Debt policy costs debtholders and public shareholders, 
especially in countriws with weak investor protection.46 This condition 
will likely result in negative reponse by investors and reduce company’s 
44 Se-Jik Kim and Mark R. Stone, “Corporate Leverage.”
45 C. Crutchly and Hansen, “A Test of  The Agency.”
46 Mara Faccio, Lary HP, Lang and Young Leslie,  “Debt and Expropriation,” 
Working Paper, pp. 1-35.
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value. Companies in Indonesia tend to have high agency conflict; new 
debt will increase agency conflict.47 Debt policy will do harm to investors 
if  corporate governance is weak, and protection for public shareholders 
is inadequate.48
The negative reaction for EI stocks may also come from ‘practical’ 
reasons. The syariah standards require company to maintain its debt below 
certain level. Debt level for EI companies is limited to maximum of  0.82 
(interest based debt over total asset), or a ratio of  55:45 between total 
debt over total company’s net worth.An increase of  debt beyond this level 
may result in removal from the list of  syariah stocks. The company will 
lose many benefits associated with syariah stocks, increase bankruptcy 
risk; hence market reacts negatively to debt issuance. 
The positive market reaction for non-EI stocks supports my 
conjecture. For non-EI stocks, debt is used as mechanism to control 
agency conflicts, resulting in positive effect of  debt on company’s value. 
Debt is usually considered a stronger mechanism to reduce agency conflict 
than dividend.49 Principal and interest payments have stronger bonding 
effect than dividend payment. Company does not an obligation to pay 
dividend, even when the company earns profit. While the company is 
obligated to pay principal and interest payments, in any situation. Failure 
to honor such obligation may result in bankruptcy. 
Results from this section support my conjecture. Debt is used as 
mechanism to control agency conflicts for non-EI stocks. For EI stocks, 
debt is not used as mechanism to control for agency conflict.Since debt 
has stronger bonding effect than dividend, I believe that results from 
debt analysis provide stronger evidence. Hence, the results from this 
section support my conjecture that EI is used as mechanism to reduce 
agency conflicts.
47 Benjamin Mauri and Annete Pajuste, “Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm 
Value,” Journal of  Banking and Finance, 2005, pp. 1813-1834.
48 Pramuan Bunkanwanichay, Jyoti Guptaz, Rokoh Rokhimx, “Debt and 
Entrenchment: Evidence from Thailand and Indonesia,” a draft by September 15, 
2003, JEL Classication: G15, G32, G34, pp. 1-28.
49 M.C. Jensen, “Agency Cost of  Free Cash Flow.”
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4.	 Ethical	Investment	and	Company’s	Value
In this section I investigate the effect of  EI on company’s value 
using regression analysis. I expect to have consistent results with the 
investigation using market reaction explained above.First,I examine the 
effect of  EI, dividend, and the interaction between EI and dividend on 
company’s value. I also include control variables: size and stock ownership.
Second, I investigate the effect of  debt and interaction between debt and 
EI on company’s value. If  EI moderates the role of  dividend and debt 
as mechanism to reduce agency conflict, I can expect to have negative 
coefficients for interaction variables. Specifically, negative coefficients 
for interaction variables indicate that EI moderates the effect of  debt 
and dividend; EI reduces the role of  dividend and debt as mechanism 
to reduce agency cost.
Tables 7and 8 summarize my findings. Table 7 reports the effect of  
dividend and interaction between dividend and EI on company’s value. 
The table shows that while the interaction between EI and Dividend 
yields sign consistent with the prediction, but the statisical power is non-
existent. The coefficient is not significant. Size shows significant positive 
coefficient; the larger the size, the better the value for the companies.
Table 7. 
The Effect of  EI, Dividend,Debt, and Interaction Between Divi-
dend and EI on Company’s Value
Prob.t-StatisticStd. ErrorCoefficientVariable
0.0591-1.890.97674-1.85041C
0.31541.010.17754-0.17857EI
0.56160.580.205350.11935DIV
0.51450.650.367860.24006OWN
0.00253.050.083940.25565SIZE
0.7161-0.360.21674-0.07890IE*DIV
0.0234Adj R-Sq 
299N = 
The above table reports regression analysis for the following 
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model:
V= α + β1EI + β2Div + β3Own + β4Size + β5IE*Div + e
V (company’s value) is proxied by Market value of  stocks plus 
book value of  debt divided by total assets. Ethical Investments 
(EI) are stocks included in List of  Syariah Securities. Dividend 
is calculated as dividend per share over earning per share. 
Own is amount of  ownership above 20%. Size is calculated 
as market price times number of  shares outstanding. Negative 
dividend and debt are deleted.
I further investigate the effect of  EI, debt, and interaction between 
EI and debt, on company’s value. Table 8 shows the result. Ownership 
provides positive and significant coefficient, but at weaker significance 
level. Size still has the strongest power in explaining company’s value. The 
regression coefficient for size is positive and significant at 1% level. While 
the coefficients for ethical investment (EI) and debt are not significant, 
the interaction between EI and debt provides the most interesting result. 
The interaction between EI and debt yields positive coefficient, and 
significant at 5%. This result shows that EI strengthens the effect of  debt 
on company’s value. The positive coefficient for interaction variable is a 
‘surprise’ since we expect to have negative coefficient. I interpret that debt 
and EI, instead of  having substitute relationship, have complementary 
relationship. Thus the presence of  EI strengthens the effect of  debt on 
company’s value. Since EI companies have ‘passed’ several tests, investors 
trust them more than non-EI companies. In that situation, debt becomes 
more valuable in increasing value for the companies.
Table 8. 
The Effect of  EI, Dividend, Debt, and Interaction between EI 
and Debt on Company’s Value
Prob. t-Statistic Std. Error Coefficient Variable
0.0040 -2.89 0.76501 -2.21200 C
0.6771 0.42 0.14880 0.06201 EI
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0.3791 0.88 0.03258 0.02868 DEBT
0.0680 1.83 0.26772 0.48961 OWN
<.0001 4.31 0.06509 0.28065 SIZE
0.0423 2.04 0.08341 0.16984 EI*DEBT
0.0615 Adj R-Sq 
505 N =
the above reports regression analysis for the following 
model:
V= α + β1EI + β2Debt + β3Own + β4Size + β5IE*Debt + e
V (company’s value) is proxied by Market value of  stocks 
plus book value of  debt divided by total assets. Ethical 
Investments (EI) are stocks included in List of  Syariah 
Securities. Own is amount of  ownership above 20%. 
Size is calculated as market price times number of  shares 
outstanding. Debt is calculated as total debt over total 
equity. Negative dividend and debt are deleted.
G. Conclusion
This research attempts to investigate the role of  ethical investment 
(EI) in reducing agency coflict, along with dividend and debt. EI stocks 
are stocks that have passed several syariah criteria developed by Stock 
Market supervisory board. These selected or chosen stocks will be trusted 
more by investors, since they are more likely to have more desirable 
characterictics, such as low information asymmtery, better conduct, and 
so on. If  these characteristics exist, I argue that agency conflict in these 
companies will be reduced. If  EI could be used to reduce agency conflict, 
then EI could substitute the role of  dividend and debt in reducing agency 
conflict. Using this argument, I can expect that EI could decrease the 
role of  dividend and debt in reducing agency conflict.
The findings for dividend payments and non-payments do not 
support my conjecture. I believe that dividend in Indonesian context 
is not used as mechanism to reduce agency conflict. Further evidence 
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from regression analysis does not supportmy conjecture. The interaction 
variables between EI and dividend have negative coefficients, but 
insignificant. I believe that debt issuance will provide cleaner and stronger 
analysis since debt is stronger mechanism to reduce agency conflict. 
For EI stocks, market reaction to debt issuance is negative, while that 
for non-EI stocks is positive. However, regression analysis shows that 
the interaction variable between EI and debt has positive effect on 
company’s value. The result from event study suggests that for non EI 
stocks, debt is used as mechanism to reduce agency conflict, and it is not 
for EI stocks.In other words, EI could be used as mechanism to reduce 
agency conflict. However, result from regression analyisis suggests that 
EI can be used to complement debt in controlling agency conflict. EI 
could strenghtens the role of  debt in increasing company’s value. Thus, 
I find an interesting result: EI has multi-dimensions, EI could substitute 
debt in reducing agency conflict, but EI strengthens the role of  debt in 
increasing company’s value.Overall I believe that EI could be used as 
mechanism to reduce agency cost and increasing company’s value.
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